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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WARRANTS NEEDED FOR BIOMETRIC ANALYSIS
TED CLAYPOOLE*
ABSTRACT
This article argues that U.S. courts and legislatures should limit law
enforcement application of biometric identification technologies within
Constitutional bounds. Specifically, warrant requirements should be enforced
for police to use facial recognition artificial intelligence and software. Such
warrant requirement is practical for law enforcement and is already within the
bounds of current Fourth Amendment cases.

* Partner at Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP.
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Surveillance creep has engulfed our world. Over the past thirty years the
tools for intruding on personal privacy and learning about the thoughts and
actions of individual humans have exploded in variety and number. 1 Those tools
expand each year and become easier to use and more available to everyone. 2
Some of this growth stems from the technology we accept into our lives. In
2021, nearly all of us carry or wear tracking devices that can pinpoint our
location on the globe. 3 We bring cameras and microphones into our homes and
then connect them to the wider world via the internet. The internet itself, through
social media, digital shopping, electronic news programs, and self-publishing,
carves windows into our feelings, priorities, and preferences that simply did not
exist prior to 1990. 4
Part of the growth in surveillance arises because technology used by
companies and law enforcement has improved in a spectacular fashion. Many
police departments now use Stingray devices that mimic cell towers to capture
the content of phone calls. 5 Others operate self-controlled drones as first
responders. 6 Networks of cameras on houses, banks, intersections, and street
corners are available for law enforcement to peruse at will. Our vehicles and
personal devices will show police where we are, both now and when a crime
was committed. 7 Artificial intelligence has advanced to a point where computers
can assist in matching license plates, fingerprints, or other identifying
information captured. 8

1. Chris Stobing, A Brief History of Government Surveillance and Spying and How it Invades
Your Privacy, COMPARITECH, https://www.comparitech.com/vpn/a-brief-history-of-governmentsurveillance-spying/ [https://perma.cc/YL7V-D6PS] (last updated Jan. 4, 2021).
2. Carly Minsky, ‘Surveillance Creep’ as Cameras Spread on Campus, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/dd732ab4-3e0a-11ea-b84f-a62c46f39bc2 [https://per
ma.cc/6ULQ-TCGB].
3. 96% of Americans own mobile phones and 81% own smart phones. Mobile Fact Sheet,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/#:~:text
=mobile%20revolution%20below.,Mobile%20phone%20ownership%20over%20time,smart
phone%20ownership%20conducted%20in%202011 [https://perma.cc/K7TZ-WUZW].
4. Alexandra Rengel, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Recommendations for Designing
a Better Future for Privacy Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2013).
5. Gregory Maleska, Stinging the Stingray: The Need for Strong State-Level AntiSurveillance Legislation, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 634 (2017).
6. Cade Metz, Police Drones are Starting to Think for Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/05/technology/police-drones.html?action=click&mod
ule=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/ZV5Z-842M].
7. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies in Policing,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 22–23 (2017).
8. Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J. L.
TECH. & POL’Y 281, 285 (2011).
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These trends have arisen in a time where politicians and the general public
are particularly wary of placing limits on policing. 9 Since the attacks on the
World Trade Center in 2001, Americans have been reluctant to place limits on
policing. But that dynamic has changed recently as the Black Lives Matter
movement brought law enforcement overreach into the national conversation. 10
However, states still seem wary of blocking police departments from gathering
every possible tool available for catching criminals and pursuing potential terror
suspects. 11 This has led to a militarization of U.S. police forces 12 and a nearly
unchecked ability for law enforcement to adopt powerful new surveillance
technologies without preliminary public policy discussion of advisability or
even constitutionality. 13 The intrusiveness of these technologies should lead to
legislative analysis of whether their application on the citizenry violates Fourth
Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure.
Discussions of what constitutes appropriate search and seizure of electronic
information have begun in federal courts, 14 and very recently appeared as a
direct ballot initiative in Michigan, 15 but have not broadly spread to state
legislatures. Where states and cities have addressed the issue, they have tended
to overreact by banning police use of facial recognition technology entirely. For
example, several cities have proscribed the use of facial recognition artificial
intelligence (“AI”) by law enforcement, properly recognizing the constitutional
harm threatened in the government application of machine learning software to
identify every face in a peaceful political protest. 16 But this extreme restriction
9. See, e.g., Victoria Bekiempis & Adam Gabbatt, US Cities and States Take Moderate Steps
to Reform Police Departments, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jun/09/new-york-police-budget-cut [https://perma.cc/Z942-8322].
10. Kara Dansky, Local Democratic Oversight of Police Militarization, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 59, 62 (2016).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 59 (“Furthermore, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) conducted a study
in 2014 and found that not only have the police become excessively militarized, but also that police
militarization has occurred with little to no public oversight.”).
13. Ashley M. Eick, Forging Ahead from Ferguson: Re-Evaluating the Right to Assemble in
the Face of Police Militarization, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1235 (2016).
14. Joh, supra note 7, at 26.
15. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1963) (as amended by Proposal 2, passed November 3, 2020,
requiring a search warrant to access electronic data or electronic communications, and securing
electronic data and electronic communications from unreasonable searches and seizures).
16. Danny McDonald, Boston City Council Unanimously Votes to Ban Use of Face
Surveillance Technology by City Government, BOSTON GLOBE (June 24, 2020, 1:33 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/24/metro/boston-city-council-unanimously-votes-ban-useface-surveillance-technology-by-city-government/
[https://perma.cc/93WL-HDE2]
(Boston
banned facial recognition AI); Rachel Metz, Portland Passes Broadest Facial Recognition Ban in
the U.S., CNN (Sept. 9, 2020, 8:06 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/tech/portland-facial-rec
ognition-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/7XGL-LSDS] (Portland prohibits both public use and
private applications in public areas for facial recognition AI); Rachel Metz, Beyond San Francisco,
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ignores the societal benefit of investigators identifying a person captured on
camera throwing a bomb into a building.
This Note proposes that both courts and legislatures should act to limit law
enforcement uses of biometric technologies in a manner consistent with the
Constitution. Facial recognition software, for example, can be an
unconstitutional impingement of search and seizure limitations for people to
whom it is applied without suspicion of criminal activity, but the same software
can be a constitutionally allowable method of identifying a suspect who was
recorded on video committing a crime. Therefore, like all tools, the technology
itself is not constitutionally suspect; however, certain applications of the
technology may be. The same person can use a hammer to build a home or to
murder a neighbor; one application is a benefit and the other a crime. Similarly,
unconstitutionally intrusive applications of facial recognition AI software
should have legal consequences, not the existence of the tool or the simple fact
that law enforcement agencies are using it.
The best way to address this problem is to require police to secure a warrant
before applying biometric machine learning software systems to identify people
in pictures and videos. This solution is easy to apply in practice and
appropriately modernizes the operation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution to address technologies that could not have been conceived
by our founders but affect the rights of citizens every day. Furthermore, a
warrant requirement for law enforcement application of this technology falls in
line with recent U.S. Supreme Court cases where electronic surveillance has
been found unconstitutionally intrusive. 17
While the Supreme Court seems to be moving in this direction, that path is
long and uncertain. It can take years for the appropriate case to wind its way
through the U.S. federal appellate system, and a case with an unusual fact pattern
can affect the breadth of a decision and the clarity of its application. Often the
Supreme Court will wait for a split in federal circuits before it will rule on a
matter. Yet facial recognition databases are continuously growing, and the
technology is engaged regularly by law enforcement agencies at all levels across

More Cities are Saying No to Facial Recognition, CNN (July 17, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.cnn
.com/2019/07/17/tech/cities-ban-facial-recognition/index.html [https://perma.cc/QCS7-VKVZ]
(Oakland banned any government agency from using facial recognition software); Xiumei Dong,
San Fransico Bans Facial Recognition Technology Surveillance, Law.com (May 14, 2019, 7:17
PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2019/05/14/san-francisco-bans-facial-recognition-technol
ogy-surveillance/?slreturn=20210227152702 [https://perma.cc/C2LD-9SY4] (San Francisco
passed “Stop Secret Surveillance” ordinance completely banning any city agency’s use of facial
surveillance).
17. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
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the country. 18 Therefore, legislatures should act now to place practical limits on
the application of facial recognition programs by police.
I. OBTAINING A WARRANT IS PRACTICAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
Since the founding of our Republic, 19 police have been required to secure a
warrant to search the person, home, and papers of citizens whenever reasonably
practicable. 20 The Supreme Court held “this rule rests upon the desirability of
having magistrates rather than police officers determine when searches and
seizures are permissible and what limitation should be placed upon such
activities.” 21 This is the streamlined system all of our policing agencies use when
they want to go somewhere or do something that might otherwise intrude on the
Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our persons, homes, and papers. 22 The
18. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 27, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46586.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5LE-YAFX] (“The [FBI] operates two programs that support the use of the
technology: (1) the Next Generation Identification–Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS), largely
supporting state and local law enforcement; and (2) the Facial Analysis, Comparison, and
Evaluation (FACE) Services Unit, supporting FBI investigations. NGI-IPS contains criminal
mugshots, and the system allows authorized law enforcement users (primarily state and local) to
search the database for potential investigative leads. The FACE Services Unit supports FBI
investigations by searching probe photos of unknown persons against faces in NGI-IPS and other
federal and state facial recognition systems authorized for FBI use.”).
19. An early statement of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures appeared in The
Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Violations of Rights, 1772, in the drafting
of which Samuel Adams took the lead. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 199, 205–06 (1971). Cornell’s annotation of the Fourth Amendment also includes the
following discussion of how early Colonial leaders became concerned about overbroad searches
and seizures:
In order to enforce the revenue laws, English authorities made use of writs of assistance,
which were general warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other place to
search for and seize “prohibited and uncustomed” goods, and commanding all subjects to
assist in these endeavors. Once issued, the writs remained in force throughout the lifetime
of the sovereign and six months thereafter. When, upon the death of George II in 1760, the
authorities were required to obtain the issuance of new writs, opposition was led by James
Otis, who attacked such writs on libertarian grounds and who asserted the invalidity of the
authorizing statutes because they conflicted with English constitutionalism. Otis lost and
the writs were issued and used, but his arguments were much cited in the colonies not only
on the immediate subject but also with regard to judicial review.
Legal Information Institute, History and Scope of the Fourth Amendment, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/history-and-scope-of-the-amend
ment#fn7amd4 [https://perma.cc/B4UF-KEVR].
20. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (“The [Fourth] Amendment was in large
part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists
and had helped speed the movement for independence. In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore,
the requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part.”).
21. Id. at 758.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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officer simply needs to show that she has a reasonable suspicion that a person
has committed a crime, and then the officer is issued a warrant that allows
intrusion on private spaces and information. 23 The process is simple, and a
warrant should be easy to obtain with clear indications that a specific individual
may have committed a crime. 24
In 1967, Justice Harlan observed that, with regard to the government’s use
of an advanced wiretapping technique, “[a]s elsewhere under the Fourth
Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law
enforcement may demand specific exceptions.” 25 This keeps our police force
from searching everyone and everything hoping to find something to support an
arrest. That’s why the protection was written into the Constitution by our
nation’s founders. The warrant requirement is meant to slow the process down
so that someone can think about whether the one group in society with a legal
monopoly on violence should be crashing through your front door and rifling
through your underwear drawer.
Police already have the correct forms to fill. They know how the process
works. Judges are addressing these matters all the time. In other words, the only
extra time required in obtaining a warrant to apply facial recognition AI to a set
of public pictures will be the extra time that police are supposed to take when
they intrude on a person’s privacy. Requiring a warrant in these cases will not
change the way law enforcement operates now on actions that intrude on privacy
and will not change the manner that police are supposed to be operating.
II. REQUIRING A WARRANT FOR POLICE TO RUN FACIAL RECOGNITION
SOFTWARE WOULD PROTECT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Facial recognition software can be used for purposes that some people
would find violative of Fourth Amendment protections against improper
searches. The Supreme Court has held that U.S. citizens have a right to remain
anonymous in their political activity, 26 stating “[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation
of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.” 27 Indiscriminate or politically targeted applications of facial
recognition software searching politically motivated crowds could violate that
right. The ability to focus on face after face, revealing name after name, must be

23. Legal Information Institute, supra note 19.
24. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 643 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating that
“compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute” serious
restraints on First Amendment rights).
27. Id.
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examined for constitutionality unless the government’s motivation clearly falls
within permissible search parameters.
We can start with an example where an American crowd was lawfully
demonstrating against the police force itself—this could be because the police
are enforcing restrictive gun laws or because of a discriminatory use of force.
Every group in the political spectrum could have a reason to protest law
enforcement policies or behaviors. For centuries, demonstrators have relied on
the anonymity of a crowd to protect them from government retaliation.
Technology makes today’s world different. Police can scan the crowd using
cameras in place for traffic control or business security, cameras worn by
uniformed officers or wielded by members of the crowd itself, or even sent over
the demonstration on drones.28 They can save and store the pictures to study at
a later date. None of these activities would likely surprise or escape the notice
of people marching that day.
But those marchers would likely be surprised that local law enforcement has
the ability to apply an AI program driven by an enormous database of
photographs tied to the names of pictured people. 29 They would not expect that
by simply marching in a political demonstration, police could quickly develop a
list of people who supported the day’s cause and use that list for any reason
without the need to explain this activity to anyone in authority. 30 In this manner,
police could develop ‘enemy lists’ of citizens who protested the activities of law
enforcement and settle scores with these people later. In other words, protesting
citizens have a reasonable expectation of not being identified and later harassed
by police, otherwise the citizens might choose not to participate in the protests
and expose themselves to the later reprisals from angry government officials.
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, quoting Judge Flaum of
the Seventh Circuit, noted:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble
data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result
is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.” 31
28. Aaron Holmes, How Police are Using Technology Like Drones and Facial Recognition to
Monitor Protests and Track People Across the US, BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2020), https://www.busi
nessinsider.com/how-police-use-tech-facial-recognition-ai-drones-2019-10#cell-tower-simulators
-or-stingrays-5 [https://perma.cc/LSP4-ZQDX].
29. Stobing, supra note 1.
30. See Holmes, supra note 28.
31. Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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Judge Flaum wrote in 2011 about tracking a person’s body constantly
everywhere it goes. 32 He was commenting on new technology enabling law
enforcement to gather information all at once in a manner that for the rest of the
country’s history would have involved extensive police resources. 33 The judge
was observing that, where a police agency could now perform a task with a touch
of a button that once would have taken dozens of officers and tens of thousands
of dollars, that new dynamic should be evaluated as to whether it constituted an
unreasonable search. 34 The same logic also applies to technology that allows
police to not only see all the people in a given space at any particular time, but
to apply names to all the faces that appear there.
Just like around-the-clock tracking technology, facial recognition software
applied by the government clearly “alters the relationship” between police and
citizens. 35 Changes in technology have been adopted by law enforcement for at
least 150 years and have shifted the nature of the relationship between
government and citizenry. When photography was introduced, mug shots made
identifications much easier. Electric lights facilitated searches. Replacing horses
with automobiles not only made long-distance travel easier, but the automobile
became a new stage to conduct personal searches. The application of
inexpensive listening and recording devices allowed deeper intrusion into the
lives of witnesses and suspects. 36 Computers, lapel cameras, drones, stingrays,
military hardware, and AI databases containing boundless biometric
identification markers for speech, faces, and DNA all change the nature of
policing. 37 For a century, U.S. judges have noted how technological changes
may affect constitutional rights. In his famous 1928 dissent, Justice Brandeis
noted the march of technology and its effect on Fourth Amendment rights,
writing:
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means
far more effective than stretching upon the rack to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet. The progress of science in furnishing the
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.
Moreover, “in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been, but of what may be.” The progress of science in

32. See United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Wood, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Jay Greene, Microsoft Won’t Sell Police its Facial-recognition Technology, Following
Similar Moves by Amazon and IBM, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/technology/2020/06/11/microsoft-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/6C75-FAQJ].
36. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967).
37. Theodore Claypoole, A Clear Solution to Police Surveillance Creep: Warrants Needed for
Biometric Analysis, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business
_law/publications/blt/2020/08/police-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/K42F-CZVT].
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furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with
wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home. 38

In 2001, a unanimous Supreme Court found that the “advance of
technology” clearly affects “the degree of privacy secured by citizens under the
Fourth Amendment,” observing that human flight had made previously private
spaces more vulnerable to observation. 39
More recently, as the pace of technological advancement has increased, the
court has addressed its intrusion on constitutional rights more frequently. For
example, Justice Scalia wrote, “[a]pplying the Fourth Amendment to new
technologies may sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a
case we have no choice.” 40 This is because we must “assure[] preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.” 41 If the technology allows law enforcement to
intrude deeply into our lives in new ways that would have been unimagined 250
years ago, it must be checked by the Fourth Amendment—requiring police to
obtain a warrant before using the intrusive technology.
When we apply this thinking to facial recognition database technology, we
can require a warrant be issued to seek the identity of obvious wrongdoers. So,
if a person is caught on camera throwing a Molotov cocktail through a plate
glass window, the police can clearly and easily use a facial recognition program
to find that person and bring them to justice. But if one simply walks in a
peaceful political demonstration, the police would not be allowed to run facial
recognition software to place them in the crowd at that time. Except for the few
cities who have directly proscribed its use, under current U.S. law with no
warrant requirement, law enforcement can currently run the biometric
identification program without limitations.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S RECENT OPINIONS SUPPORT A WARRANT
REQUIREMENT FOR POLICE TO APPLY FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE
The Supreme Court has already begun to move toward this conclusion,
insisting on Fourth Amendment protections for transformative technologies,
requiring a warrant for law enforcement to place a thirty-day tracking beacon on
a personal vehicle 42 and insisting that a warrant is needed to open and review

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 768 (2010).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (2001).
Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
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the contents of a citizen’s smartphone. 43 Extending the protection of digital
privacy against random searches and seizures, the Court even held that police
need a warrant to request from relevant service providers historic cell phone
tracking records to pinpoint your location at different times in the past. 44 This
latter decision extended an exception to decades of precedent protecting the
concept that allowing a third party to create, access or hold private records
destroys an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to protect those records from
government search and seizure. 45
Seventy years ago the Supreme Court held that keeping one’s name from
being associated with political causes was a part of the right to free speech and
free association. 46 There may be reason to fear the government taking note of
such association, which is why the Supreme Court decided that the State of
Alabama in the 1950s was not allowed to require the local NAACP chapter to
produce a list of all of its members, placing each member at physical risk. 47
Using current technology, the State of Alabama would not need to analyze
membership lists, but could capture video of everyone entering meetings and
apply facial recognition software to entire group, finding the names it seeks with
the push of a button. This AI could also allow government enforcement officers
to not only see who is entering gay bars, gun clubs, and political protests, but
then to identify each individual. Clearly the technology, if randomly or
maliciously applied, could invade or chill people’s speech and assembly rights.
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has extended its concern expressed in
the NAACP case to protect the privacy of individuals even in public places. In
the recent smart phone data accessibility case of Carpenter v. U.S.—confirming
that protection from unlawful search and seizure extends well beyond the home
of a protected party—Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “[a] person does not
surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public
sphere.” 48 To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” 49 Roberts then
noted how technology has changed the calculation of what should be considered
a reasonable expectation of privacy even in the public sphere, writing, “[i]n the
past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of
records and the frailties of recollection . . . [with current technology] police need

43. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
44. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220–21 (2018).
45. Id. at 2220 (extending exceptions to the third-party doctrine initially raised in United States
v. Miller, 425 US 435 (1976)); Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
46. NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
47. Id. at 466.
48. 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
49. Id.
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not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual,
or when.” 50
The court has recognized that anonymously attending sensitive political
meetings is an important right covered by the First Amendment, and that limited
technological intrusions on privacy is an important value of the Fourth
Amendment. Facial recognition software, where used indiscriminately by
police, seems to run afoul of both of these constitutional values recognized by
the Court. The new technology of machine-learning facial recognition software,
like the global positioning system data or cell phone triangulation information
pulled from a citizen’s smartphone, holds the potential to reveal both private and
constitutionally protected aspects of a person’s life.
The Court in the Carpenter case decided that the always-there mobility plus
the deep trove of information carried by the smartphone demanded a different
Fourth Amendment analysis than stationary telephones, and that individuals
maintain legitimate expectations of privacy in the record of their physical
movements as captured through cell phone records, even if those movements
were taken through public spaces where anyone could see the individual. 51 So,
individuals congregated in a politically active crowd should not lose such
protections from intrusive technology simply because the crowd had made its
point in the public sphere. Harkening back to one of the first Supreme Court
discussions of privacy rights in a Fourth Amendment context, the court wrote:
As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—as
“[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government”—to ensure that the “progress of science” does not
erode Fourth Amendment protections. Here the progress of science has afforded
law enforcement a powerful new tool to carry out its important responsibilities.
At the same time, this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the
Framers, “after consulting the lessons of history,” drafted the Fourth
Amendment to prevent. 52

Using precisely the same logic, the powerful new technological tool of
artificial intelligence driven facial recognition software can be used to carry out
important responsibilities for the government, while some of its abuses are the
same type—indiscriminate or punitive searches—that the founders drafted the
Fourth Amendment to prevent. As the Court decided in Carpenter, the obvious
solution to this technologic and constitutional quandary is to require the police
to apply for and receive a warrant to use the potentially risky technology. 53
When will application of the technology rise to a level that a warrant is
required? The Court, in the recent Kyllo decision, held that “a Fourth
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 2218.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
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Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” 54 Just like the
concerns of the NAACP who wished to keep their membership rolls from access
by the State of Alabama in the 1950s, it seems reasonable that modern peaceful
political protesters could subjectively fear being named to police or
unsympathetic government officials if they are identified by name during
political gatherings. For this reason, unregulated application of facial
recognition technology may well violate the Supreme Court’s conception of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this precise question. In her
concurrence to the long-term surveillance case of United States v. Jones, Justice
Sotomayor proposed:
I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.
I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits
of [new technology] through lawful conventional surveillance techniques . . . I
would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the
absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse,
especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises
of police power to and prevent “a too permeating police surveillance. 55

Using new technology to identify anyone and everyone occupying visible spaces
is the ultimate example of “permeating police surveillance.” Facial recognition
software, when combined with the current growing omnipresence of
surveillance video in metropolitan areas, enables this exercise of police power
more than any tool we have ever known.
The most defensible constitutional choice in this circumstance is for
Congress or multiple state legislatures to place limits on policing power by
requiring warrants to run biometric identification software. Several Justices
seem to agree, as they joined Justice Alito in his concurrence in Jones, where he
wrote:
In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither
constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for any
extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken
. . . In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution
to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy
and public safety in a comprehensive way. 56

54. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
55. Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
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In November of last year, U.S. Senators Coons and Lee introduced bipartisan legislation requiring federal law enforcement to obtain a court order
before using facial recognition technology. 57 This bill provided a logical
framework for protecting Americans from a powerful new state-operated
technology that has grown unchecked as a tool for intruding on citizens’ privacy.
Since that time, the Facial Recognition and Biometric Moratorium Act was
introduced into both houses of Congress this summer. 58 The Act calls for a
complete prohibition on police use of facial recognition software and similar
biometric technology like voice recognition or gait identification systems. 59
However, this act, like some of the city-level bans that have been enacted in the
United States, overreacts to the availability of this technology. Biometric
identification tools are valid and useful law enforcement implements, so banning
them removes an important field of investigation for police. The tool is not the
constitutional problem. Indiscriminate police application of the tool is the
problem.
But requiring a warrant to use the powerful technologies stops
indiscriminate and hostile political applications, while maintaining the
software’s availability to help catch criminals. Warrant obligations are the right
step to protect our privacy and other constitutional rights while applying the
technology to important problems. We should not wait for the right case to rise
to the Supreme Court before limiting use of this technology. A legislative
solution is best and fastest.

57. S. 2878, 116th Congress (2019–2020).
58. See generally H.R. Res. 7356, 116th Cong. (2019–2020).
59. Id. at § 3(a).
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